produced, we have adopted a provision from the South Australian Act of 1893, enabling a foreign company to appoint under its common seal some person in Western Australia or elsewhere to act as its attorney, and in the exercise of the power thereby conferred to delegate such powers to any other person or to appoint a substitute in the State to exercise such powers, and providing such company shall be deemed to have complied with Section 198 of the principal Act. The four subclauses of Clause 2 provide for certain formalities to be gone through. The only other new feature of the Bill is contained in Clause 3, which purports to amend Section 201 of the principal Act. I shall read the section, in order that hon. members may understand the effect of the amendment:—

In the event of the death of any sole or sole surviving attorney whose power of attorney shall have been deposited in the office of the Registrar under this part of the Act, or in the event of the filing under the last preceding section of a notice of revocation of the power of any such attorney, the company shall not, from the expiration of six months after such death or one week after the filing of such notice, carry on business in the said colony until the provisions of Subsections (1), (2), (3), and (4) of Section 198 shall have been complied with, or again complied with, as the case may be.

By the amendment, it it proposed that the words "one week" shall be struck out and the following inserted in lieu: "one month or such extended time as may be allowed under special circumstances by the Registrar." Plainly, in case of a revocation coming by cable from the old country, or America, or New Zealand, it is impossible to comply with the law within a week. We therefore propose to make the term one month in any case, and we provide farther that in special circumstances the Registrar of Companies may extend that period. I am sure the House will see that it is a desirable amendment to make. I have much pleasure in moving the second reading of the Bill.

Question put and passed.

Bill read a second time.

IN COMMITTEE.

Passed through Committee without debate, reported without amendment, and the report adopted.

STAMP ACT AMENDMENT BILL.

IN COMMITTEE.

Resumed from the 12th November; Hon. M. L. Moss in charge.

Clauses 3 to 15, inclusive—agreed to.

Schedules (2)—agreed to.

New Clause:

HON. M. L. MOSS moved that the following be added as Clause 16:—

Cancellation of Stamps on Policies of Insurance.—The duty upon any policy of insurance may be denoted by an adhesive stamp, which may be cancelled by the person by whom the instrument is first executed at the time of execution.

Clause passed, and added to the Bill.

Preamble, Title—agreed to.

Bill reported with amendments, and the report adopted.

ADJOURNMENT.

The House adjourned at 5·22 o'clock, until the next Tuesday.

Legislative Assembly,

Thursday, 20th November, 1902.

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THE DEPUTY SPEAKER took the Chair at 2·30 o'clock, p.m.

PRAYERS.

QUESTIONS—COOLGARDIE WATER SCHEME.

OPENING CEREMONY.

MR. REID asked the Minister for Works: 1, Whether it is a fact that,

contrary to all promises made since the inception of the Coolgardie Water Scheme that the opening ceremony in connection with the formal turning on of the water should be held at Coolgardie, this decision has been altered, and that the intention is now to hold the opening ceremony at Kalgoorlie. 2, Whether the Minister will explain why this change has been made in the face of a long standing promise.

THE MINISTER FOR WORKS replied: 1 and 2, I am not aware of any such promises nor of any such decision. The intention is to have the opening ceremony at Kalgoorlie.

FIREWOOD FOR PUMPING STATION.

MR. JACOBY asked the Minister for Works: 1, Whether he has decided to utilise the waste timber near the Mundaring Weir for the furnaces at Nos. 1 and 2 Pumping Stations. 2, If so, will he, in view of the fact that because of the near completion of the works at Mundaring, many men long employed there, and in most cases married, are about to be dismissed, make arrangements for putting this work in hand at once.

THE MINISTER FOR WORKS replied: 1, Specifications are now being prepared with a view to inviting tenders for supplying firewood to Pumping Stations Nos. 1 and 2, and the advisability or otherwise of using firewood in lieu of coal will be considered on receipt of the tenders. 2, In the event of a contract being let for supply of firewood, the men under reference, being locally resident, would no doubt have the best chance of employment, but it is not considered advisable to undertake firewood-getting by departmental labour.

QUESTION—STOCK ROUTE, WATER SUPPLY.

MR. JACOBY asked the Minister for Works: 1, If his attention has been drawn to the inadequate supply of water for stock on the overland stock route, particularly between Mullewa and Mingenew. 2, If so, what steps are being taken to provide larger supplies.

THE MINISTER FOR WORKS replied: As regards that portion of the overland stock route lying between Mullewa and Mingenew, negotiations are in progress with a view to deviating from a portion of the old route. On this deviation there are good supplies of water, with the exception of one stage of 22 miles, on which, however, the existence of good water has been proved by boring, and on completion of the negotiations mentioned, wells will be sunk to render this water available. In connection with the stock routes as a whole, the Government has gangs at present employed upon them effecting repairs and improvements, and the whole question has for some time past been receiving close attention.

REPORT—MRS. TRACEY, ALLEGED WRONGS.

MR. MORAN brought up the report of the select committee, with a recommendation.

Report received and read.

MUNICIPAL INSTITUTIONS ACT AMENDMENT BILL.

Introduced by the PREMIER, and read a first time.

ROADS AND STREETS CLOSURE BILL.

IN COMMITTEE.

MR. ILLINGWORTH in the Chair; the PREMIER in charge of the Bill

Clause 1—agreed to.

Schedule:

THE PREMIER moved that the following be added:—

In the City of Perth.—That portion of Ord street, Perth, extending from the eastern side of Havelock street to the western side of Harvest terrace.

It was that portion of the street running between the High School reserve and the Observatory reserve. It had never been used and was never likely to be used, because it came into Harvest Terrace where the new Parliament Houses were being built. This street destroyed the whole reserve, and if closed would give an area for the establishment of a State school if so desired.

MR. MORAN: It would be well to postpone this matter. He did not know whether the Perth authorities had been consulted; but they should have been in such a case. He was glad the Government were setting aside a site for a State school in this locality. It was the best State school site in Perth; but it was not necessary to close the street for the

purpose of setting aside a site for a State school.

THE PREMIER: The Bill could be recommitted later.

MR. MORAN: Would the Government consult the Perth City Council?

THE PREMIER: Yes.

MR. FOULKES: Members should have an opportunity of discussing this schedule. It would be well to recommit the Bill at a later date.

Amendment passed, and the schedule as amended agreed to.

Bill reported with an amendment.

CONSTITUTION ACT AMENDMENT BILL.

IN COMMITTEE.

Resumed from the previous sitting.

Clause 58—Power of Minister to speak in either House:

MR. MORAN: This was a clause with which he entirely disagreed. There was no justification for the clause. Except that it presented, at a first glance, some attraction, there was no merit in it. It was an innovation which he might characterise as verging on a fad. If the intention of the clause was fully carried out, then the leader of the Opposition or the leading member opposed to any particular Bill should also be entitled to go to another House and speak in opposition to a measure. In the Lower Chamber a measure might be discussed at great length and be only just carried. A Minister was then to be sent to the other House as a special pleader and place his special case before members; but the other Chamber would not have an opportunity of hearing the champions of the Lower House who were against the measure. Whilst the Upper House remained as it was, he was not "sweet" on any radical innovation in our form of government. Could the Premier point to a single case since he had been in Parliament where such a provision was necessary, and where the representative of the Government in the other House had not thoroughly done justice to measures which had been sent there? Or could the Premier point to a case in the Lower House where the representative of the Government from the Upper House would have added anything to the debate? The argument which he was advancing applied also to the proposal to have a joint sitting of the two Houses. We had never known the necessity for it in Western Australia; and he had never known a case where there had been a deadlock between the two Houses. One was inclined to say the Upper House had never given any strong reason for its existence up to date. There had been a decided lack on the part of the Upper House to assert themselves as a property House. Supposing a Minister of the Crown left the Assembly and went to another Chamber, would he be absent during the whole of the debate on any particular Bill? If so his services would not be available in the Lower House. Ministers were not specialists. Take the Minister for Lands, who was the only paid direct representative of the Government in the Upper House: could anyone say the Minister for Lands would carry any weight on a lands question in the Assembly? It would be of no advantage to bring Dr. Jameson to this Chamber. He did not know what special light the Minister for Mines could throw on any mining question in the Upper House, where there were direct representatives of mining who knew as much about the industry as the Minister for Mines. There was no necessity for this provision. A member of this Assembly holding a portfolio had no right in the world to enter the other Chamber, not having been elected to appeal to that Chamber and not being supposed to influence it even indirectly. In any case, measures were discussed in Cabinet and the Government had two representatives in the Upper House. One could imagine the Premier going off to fascinate the Legislative Council, and returning to this Chamber just in time to vote in a want-of-confidence division. The operation of this clause would not tend to enhance the dignity of Parliament. From a democratic standpoint, both Chambers had been everything that could be desired. The Upper House had never stood in the way of social legislation or public works measures. There was no reason to believe in the imminence of a crisis. Difficulties might be met as they arose. He moved that the clause be struck out.

MR. FOULKES: Clause 56 was introduced into this Bill because the principle existed in the British Constitution; Clause 57 was inserted because it had appeared in previous legislation of our own; and

Clause 58 was included because the Cape Colony Constitution contained a similar provision. These might be termed the selected clauses of the Bill.

MR. MORAN: The trouble was that oddities had been picked out everywhere.

MR. FOULKES: The Premier could well argue against a clause of this kind. Clause 67 was virtually an admission that the number of Ministers was too large; this went to prove that Clause 58 was really not necessary, because if at present there were too many Ministers there must be ample time for members of the Cabinet to explain Bills to one another. It was impossible to believe that in the absence of this clause important Bills would be introduced in either House by Ministers not fully understanding their nature. In such circumstances, the legislation as well as the administration of the country would be controlled departmentally. The Minister sent to another Chamber to explain a Bill would not necessarily be the Minister who had introduced it: the best advocate would be chosen for the task. The Minister for Works might be selected for his persuasiveness; if satisfying assurances were required, the Colonial Secretary would be delegated; whilst legal measures would be duly explained in the Premier's able manner. The time had not arrived for passing a measure of this kind. We had little knowledge of the working of this provision in Cape Colony. One Premier of that colony had testified that the provision had worked well, but farther evidence was required. Besides, there were Premiers and Premiers. If the provision was so advisable and necessary as represented, it was strange that the Governments of sister States had not thought well to adopt it.

THE PREMIER: It was to be hoped that this clause would receive consideration on broader ground than that taken by the member for Claremont (Mr. Foulkes). If we were to object to any suggestion of change unless the proposal were supported not only by one precedent elsewhere, but by multitudinous precedents, then so far as constitutional reform was concerned we should have stagnation, and not progress. In introducing the clause he had pointed out that a similar provision was to be found in the Constitution of Cape Colony, and that it had been in force there for some years. He had also referred to the very eulogistic opinion of the clause expressed to the Premier of Victoria by the Premier of Cape Colony, Sir Gordon Sprigg. Victoria at the time the opinion was given contemplated an amendment of its Constitution, and this expression of opinion was obtained with the object of ascertaining whether a similar clause should be introduced into the proposed Victorian Constitution Act Amendment Bill. Following on that opinion, and no doubt also by reason of what Victorian members of Parliament had seen of the necessity of such a provision, the clause was introduced into the Bill which was before the Victorian Parliament at the time of the last dissolution. Doubtless a similar clause would appear in the Bill when revived. It was noteworthy that both the present Premier, Mr. Irvine, and the late Premier, Sir Alexander Peacock, had spoken strongly in favour of the clause. So far as one could gather from the Victorian debate, there had really been no opposition to the provision.

MR. FOULKES: Would it not be well for us to wait and see how the clause worked in Victoria?

THE PREMIER: An example had been given of its working during some years in Cape Colony, and another example had been given of leading men on both sides of the Victorian Parliament thinking fit to introduce such a clause into their Constitution.

MR. MORAN: We must not presume that the provision would be adopted.

THE PREMIER: At present, he was concerned only to state the facts. We had these two instances in favour of the clause.

MR. FOULKES: There were 24 Parliaments under the British Crown, and the hon. gentleman had referred to only two out of the 24.

MR. MORAN: To only one, really.

THE PREMIER: The hon. member's (Mr. Foulkes's) interjection was utterly irrevelant. From the mention of the one State in which the provision had been adopted, the obvious inference was that others had not adopted it. In one Australian State, Victoria, the amendment had been proposed: in the others, not. The point he wanted to make, however, was that those two instances spoke

in favour of the clause. The opinion of men of far wider experience than ours in this connection should carry weight with us; but even supposing that these two instances in support had not been given, could anyone advance a reason why a Bill introduced into and carried through this House by a Minister who knew the Bill, who was in touch with all its clauses, who knew exactly what debate had occurred in this Chamber, who had not merely the benefit of the knowledge acquired in introducing the Bill into the House but also the added benefit of having listened to criticisms in this Chamber, should not be advocated in the other Chamber by that Minister? Was not that Minister better qualified to place the Bill before the Legislative Council than another Minister who perhaps had to take the measure up at a moment's notice?

MR. FOULKES: Would the Premier also let the leader of the Opposition go to the other House?

MR. MORAN: To be consistent, all of us ought to go.

THE PREMIER said he was glad to see that the hon. member (Mr. Foulkes) could not answer the question. The man who introduced a measure into the Lower House, who conducted it through the House, who knew the whole of the debate in connection with it and heard the criticism, was in a far stronger position to introduce that Bill to the Upper House than any Minister in the Upper House could be. When a Bill had once passed this House it had nothing whatever to do with the Opposition, and nothing to do with an individual who in this House might have taken a prominent part in opposition to it. It went from this Chamber as the Bill of this Chamber; not as the Bill of the Government and not as the Bill of the Opposition. There was no need for us to renew in the Upper House the discussion which took place here when the Bill was introduced as the Bill of the Government. Obviously there was no occasion whatever for a loquacious member of the Opposition or for some other loquacious private member to have the right to impose on the Legislative Council the inflictions we suffered in the Lower House. If we passed Bills here and wanted to have them carried in the Upper House, it was an obligation we owed to the Upper House to keep them fully advised on the proposed Bills. Not only once but dozens of times Bills had considerably been interfered with because in the Upper House the members had not had full explanations as to details, which, had they had them, would have modified their action. It did not follow that because a Bill had not been rejected as a whole, harm had not been done. Constantly we found comparatively small amendments made, the effect of which was to somewhat mar the full efficiency of the Bill. Why should we not place the Upper House in possession of all the facts in favour of the Bill?

MR. FOULKES: That meant that the Government must keep a Minister there all the time.

THE PREMIER: If a Minister went down there on every Bill he would neglect his duty in this House; but a Minister could stay away from the House now, if he liked; he was not bound to come here; he could look after his departmental work instead of looking after his parliamentary work. The power asked for would only be exercised in the case of important Bills passed by the House. Why, for instance, should he (the Premier) not have the right to go to the Legislative Council and place before the Council the arguments with which he introduced the Factories Bill?

MR. FOULKES: Why should the Government not give the same opportunity to the leader of the Opposition to explain his views?

MR HOPKINS: Why should not a private member in charge of a private Bill have the power to explain his views to the Council?

THE PREMIER: The intention was to exercise this power only in relation to Bills of very great importance. As a matter of fact, private Bills when once they had passed one House passed the other as a matter of course. That was usually the case in the old country. Private Bills went before a select committee, and if the committee reported in favour of them, that generally controlled the whole position. A Bill in relation to which this power would be exercised would go before the Legislative Council as modified, if it were modified, owing to the discussion that took place in this House. As to the fact that in the past no

difficulty had arisen between one Chamber and another, there was no reason why we should not experience the same difficulty and friction as had been experienced elsewhere; a great deal of which friction was due more to misapprehension than to a desire to run counter to the wishes of one House or the other. It was our duty to place at the disposal of the other House the Minister best able to explain the intentions of a Bill placed before that House. This applied particularly in Western Australia, where we had only one Minister in the Upper House. No one Minister could adequately give a full knowledge of all the details of the Bills which passed the House from time to time. It was utterly impossible. We had during the course of a session Bills which emanated from the Treasury, Works Department, the Railways, Attorney General, and the Colonial Secretary's Department. We had Bills like that before us this year. They came every year, and they always would come, and when they went to the Upper House we asked one man to have all the details of these Bills at his fingers' ends; and in addition to that to look after the ordinary conduct of affairs in the second Chamber. No man could do that advantageously, and the consequence must be that the Upper House in connection with these Bills was never so fully informed as it had a right to expect to be, and as the country had a right to expect it to be. We did not discharge our duty if we allowed Bills to be interfered with on account of want of knowledge in the Upper House arising from the fact that we insisted upon one Minister doing there all the Legislative work which was done here by four or five members.

MR. FOULKES: The debates were reported, and the members of the Upper House had an opportunity of reading them.

THE PREMIER: How many members in this Chamber read through the debates which took place in the Upper House? When the member for Claremont was away for a day or two, did he read up *Hansard*?

MR. FOULKES: The reports in the Press were read by him, and the Press reported debates pretty fully.

THE PREMIER: Then the hon. member suggested that hon. members of the other House should rely upon the Press reports? Let members shut their eyes to what was done elsewhere, and ask the simple question whether it was not desirable we should allow the member who knew most about a Bill, who knew most about the various currents and influences that controlled and moulded that Bill on its passage in one House, to present that Bill to the other house.

MR. JACOBY: One of the best advantages of the second Chamber was the fact that the second Chamber approached questions that reached them from this House with much less partisan feeling and prejudice than existed in the Assembly. There were a good few practical advantages in favour of the reform proposed by the Premier, but on the whole we wanted to be a little bit farther satisfied, and to have a few more convincing arguments than had been adduced at present before we adopted such drastic reform. If a Minister succeeded in carrying a Bill in this House, it was a party Bill, and if he had the right to address another House on the question, it was surely right that the arguments advanced against it by the Opposition should also be heard in the Legislative Council. In many cases important provisions in Government Bills passed by this House had been opposed in the other House by the Government, and we had a recent instance in connection with taxation proposals, when the Minister in charge of the Bill voted against a very important provision assented to by a very great majority of this House. Then there was an opportunity of reading *Hansard* and the reports in the public Press, to get some idea as to the arguments brought forward in the Lower House in favour of any Bill. In regard to the recent Railway Bill, a most important principle in the measure was altered by the Assembly, and it would be absurd to expect a member of the Government who fought so strongly for the retention of that clause in the Bill to fight just as strenuously on the opposite side in the Upper House. We might have occasions, as we had had before, when a want-of-confidence motion might be moved in the Upper House. Were we then to admit the principle that the mover of that want-of-confidence motion should come down and pursue his motion in this House? It was

a broad principle. If we adopted this principle in regard to Ministers, we ought also to provide that the mover of a motion in one House should have the right to advocate that motion in the other House. We had a number of important proposals carried in the Assembly, and doubtless members of the Labour party would be particularly anxious to convert another place regarding their proposals, and would endeavour to get an opportunity of pleading personally in the Council for motions carried in this Chamber. If we had this principle as far as Ministers were concerned, we could not stop from extending it all round. If a time arrived when a great conflict took place regarding an important principle in a Bill, and it might be deemed highly necessary for the Upper House to hear the Minister who had charge of the measure in the Assembly, if a request were made that the Minister should be heard in the Upper House, the Upper House would, no doubt, accede to it.

THE PREMIER: That was unheard of.

MR. JACOBY: This proposal of the Minister was almost as unheard of. Although there were many practical advantages to be urged in favour of this proposal, we should, at the present time, hesitate before passing it.

MR. MORAN: Nothing could be more absurd than that such a sweeping change in the Constitution as that proposed should be about to be carried, perhaps, in so thin a House. He could not imagine anything more lamentable.

MR. JACOBY: What was the matter with the Chamber?

MR. MORAN: We were going to carry a great change probably, because he knew there were a good many members in this House, blind as they always were, who would do anything the Premier asked them to do, who never took the trouble to read up for themselves, and who did not listen to any argument. Members would be seen voting blindly for the clause, without discussion or farther explanation from the Premier beyond the fact that it had been law for some time in a small British colony, and that Mr. Peacock, in Victoria, had recommended it. The whole burden of the Premier's remarks was that Ministers from this House should be allowed to educate the Upper House. [MR. DAGLISH: And that was needed.] Surely not. There were gentlemen in the Upper House who could educate the hon. member. In all Australian Upper Chambers were members with wide political experience and of long service; and it would be well if such men were always available in Parliament. If the Upper Chamber were abolished, he hoped many of the members would find places in this, even if they displaced young and less experienced politicians. In politics, as in every other vocation, practice made perfect, and experience taught moderation and wisdom. Parliament should be well leavened with experienced men, and not entirely composed of novices. The Premier was asked what would happen to a Bill introduced by a private member dealing with a land and income tax, or to a resolution that such a Bill be introduced, carried by the Government majority against the Opposition here, and ordered to be transmitted to the Council.

THE PREMIER: A resolution dealing with taxation could not be transmitted to the Council.

MR. MORAN: But other important resolutions could. Who would advocate them in another place? In the case of measures carried here against the Government, Ministers would go to another place to bias that Chamber. None of the counter arguments would be repeated there, and according to the Premier they would not be known in the Council, because members in one Chamber did not read debates in another. To suppose that Upper House members needed such education was to insult them. They watched our debates so closely that they often sent back our crude legislation for amendment, while the converse could not be maintained. They frequently pointed out glaring errors in our Bills.

THE PREMIER: When?

MR. DIAMOND: They only rectified mutilations made by this Chamber.

MR. MORAN: Well, men who could do that did not need educating. The Premier waxed wroth at the suggestion that this provision existed in only one British colony. If, as he also maintained, conflicts between the two Houses were likely to occur here, seeing that they had occurred in other colonies, why had not

those other colonies found it necessary to adopt this suggestion?

THE PREMIER: Some of the best politicians in the East had advocated the proposal.

MR. MORAN: No doubt it had been advocated in Great Britain also. It was not a new idea; but it would be a novelty to make it law. As well might the Premier urge that when a municipal conference framed a Bill, the conference should be allowed to nominate a delegate to take charge of the Bill in this Chamber.

THE PREMIER: Such a conference was not responsible for legislation.

MR. MORAN: Every conference which drafted a Bill was responsible for legislation. In Australia the clause was absolutely novel; there was no occasion for it. It was recommended by Sir A. J. Peacock; but if importance attached to his recommendations, why was he now out of office? Imagine the Colonial Secretary, after the Government had been defeated in respect of the provision in the Harbour Trust Bill that members of Parliament should be paid, urging in the Upper House the horrors which would result from such payment! Probably the versatility of the Minister would be equal to the occasion, but to the public the spectacle would not be edifying. The same Minister recommended three railway commissioners, and his proposal was promptly negatived. Imagine him in the Upper Chamber waxing eloquent in his advocacy of one commissioner! If he did not, he would not be doing his duty to this Chamber; if he did, he would look like a fool.

MR. DIAMOND: The clause was purely permissive. The hon. member assumed a Minister would always go to the other House.

MR. MORAN: Oh! then the Minister would not go when to go would be awkward?

MR. FOULKES: He might go to explain such a measure as the Collie-Boulder Railway Bill.

MR. MORAN: Very effectively. And if the Minister for Works failed in that task, he might be reinforced by the Colonial Secretary, who could demonstrate the advisableness of allowing a private company to build a railway and enjoy a monopoly. Upper House members were supposed to be educated and experienced men, and were responsible to constituencies larger than ours; therefore they were better able than we to decide judicially on important measures, needed no assistance, and certainly not the assistance of a partisan from this House, who could give nothing but a biased and one-sided opinion of a measure. The Premier should postpone the consideration of this important clause till a special evening, when there could be a decent attendance.

MR. HASTIE: Members would not come.

MR. MORAN: Let us have a full House and a close division. Now, scarcely any but unquestioning Government supporters were present, and there was little more than a bare quorum. The change was so great that it ought to be carried by fully one-half of the members of the House. There was no satisfaction in carrying changes in a thin House, and he could absolutely guarantee that the Upper House would throw the proposal out. He would do all he could to influence the Upper House by discussing the matter, and he would ask members of the Council not to take notice of changes made in a thin House. The Premier, who like every enthusiast was a bit faddy, was in favour of democratic and social legislation; but that did not say that everything he introduced was good. The Upper House would do their duty to the country by not agreeing to important changes which were carried without vote in a full House. He hoped the Council would reject this provision, and if the Premier felt strongly upon it he could move to recommit the Bill and try to reintroduce the proposal. One would like to see the question discussed in both the morning newspapers of Perth. We should get a superior opinion on this matter by deliberate, cold, calculating and critically-worked-up leading articles in the daily Press. He would like to see the matter discussed for a week or two, and he hoped the Premier would agree to postpone the clause. If not, he would divide the Committee upon it.

MR. DAGLISH: It seemed that everyone who supported the clause was accused of being an unquestioning supporter of the Government, and willing to support anything the Government proposed; but those who opposed the

proposal were not suggested as being constant and unswerving opponents of the Government. He was not supporting the proposal because it was introduced by the Government, but because it seemed to be a reasonable one; and it would be an advantage to the Assembly if, having to consider a Land Bill at any time, making important changes in the administration of the Lands Department, we could have in the Assembly [MR. MORAN: A surgeon to explain it] the gentleman in charge of the Lands Department who was responsible for the introduction of the Bill, to explain the measure. He preferred to look at the proposal from its broader aspect; and the member for West Perth had given good reasons why there could be no harm in the proposal. He told members that not only could a Minister not educate the Upper House, but that members of the Upper House had far more experience and capacity for legislation than the members of this Chamber, therefore Ministers could be educated by members in another place. He (Mr. Daglish) welcomed the proposal because it seemed to offer advantages to both Houses. When any Bill affecting any particular department was introduced, the House would have the benefit of hearing the reasons for its introduction by the person responsible for the administration of the department concerned. There was no great danger in the proposal, and he was somewhat surprised at the objection to it on the ground of its newness. The same argument might be brought against any innovation. Members of either House would have an opportunity of knowing the reasons that had dictated the introduction of any Bill which was brought forward.

MR. MORAN: What member would say that the present Minister for Lands would be able to give any information to the member for Northam or the member for the Williams on land matters? It could scarcely be expected that the Minister for Lands would be an authority on land settlement. He was not supposed to know anything about it. The Minister might be a very fine administrator, and as far as the information at hand was concerned he put plenty of enthusiasm into his work; but it was scarcely to be expected that Dr. Jameson, who was a learned and experienced surgeon and physician, could teach the member for Northam or the member for the Williams anything on land matters, or teach the member for the Gascoyne anything about the growing of cattle. Unless Ministers were specialists there would be no advantage in this proposal; but he could see that when Ministers went into another Chamber they could make rash statements and give biased opinions. How could the Minister for Lands spend a week in the Lower House over a big Land Bill? Would the other House adjourn to allow him to do so. In matters of this kind one would like to see good sound reasons given for the proposal; but it was no reason to say that because the proposal was in force in Cape Colony and nowhere else in the British dominions and that it had been talked of somewhere else, we should adopt the proposal here. He would divide the Committee on the subject, and he thought the proposal should be carried by an absolute majority of members.

MR. HOPKINS supported the clause as it was the first step towards the unification of the two Chambers. He did not agree with the member for West Perth in his reference to the Minister for Lands. It did not appear of much significance who the Minister for Lands might be if he was in office for a certain term, because if a Bill came from the Lands Department, the Minister would, before it was brought before the Cabinet have discussed it with the responsible officers in his department, and anyone without being an expert who had common and ordinary intelligence, having discussed a proposition with those who had actual experience, could arrive at reasonable conclusions. If the clause did not work well it could be repealed at a future time.

MR. FOULKES opposed the clause particularly because of the unfair position in which it would place members of this House. Why should this privilege be confined to five members of the House, the other 45 not being allowed to have it? The position would be that many important measures would come before the House, brought forward by the Government, and some members, perhaps many, would strongly oppose those measures. Members of the Upper House acted to a

great extent as judges of the legislation of this Chamber, and were supposed to review it impartially; yet there would be one advocate going from this House to the other, not only to explain a measure there but to advocate its adoption by that House, this clause enabling him to take part in the discussion in that Chamber on the particular measure, while no member of this House opposed to the measure would have the privilege of explaining the disadvantages or taking part in the discussion. A Bill might be carried in this House by a majority of one; and although strongly opposed here, no member opposing it would have the privilege of explaining the reasons for that opposition, the only member from this House privileged to address the other House being a Minister advocating the adoption of the measure. The leader of the Opposition might be as capable of explaining the features of a Bill as the Minister in charge of it. If members of the other House wanted to hear a particular Bill discussed in this House, there was a gallery here set apart for them, and he knew as a former member of that Chamber that it was the practice of many members to come here and hear discussions on important questions; therefore this made it the less necessary for a Minister to go to the other House to advocate the adoption of a particular Bill. If this clause were carried to-day in a Committee of 19 or 20 members, it would be no credit to pass so important a clause in so thin a House.

Amendment (that the clause be struck out) put, and a division taken with the following result:—

Ayes	...	...	...	9
Noes	...	...	...	15
Majority against			...	6

Ayes.	Noes.
Mr. Atkins	Mr. Bath
Mr. Butcher	Mr. Daglish
Mr. Foulkes	Mr. Diamond
Mr. Holman	Mr. Gardiner
Mr. Moran	Mr. Gordon
Mr. O'Connor	Mr. Gregory
Mr. Piesse	Mr. Hastie
Mr. Taylor	Mr. Hopkins
Mr. Jacoby (*Teller*).	Mr. James
	Mr. Johnson
	Mr. Kingsmill
	Mr. Rason
	Mr. Reid
	Mr. Wallace
	Mr. Higham (*Teller*).

Amendment thus negatived.

Clause put and passed.

MR. MORAN said he wished to move a new subclause, by which any member of the House introducing a Bill or a proposition should be enabled to advocate the same in the Legislative Council.

THE CHAIRMAN: The clause had been passed, and a subclause could not be added at this stage.

Clause 59—Powers of the House in respect of legislation:

MR. MORAN: By this clause the Premier intended to continue the present provision in our Constitution which enabled the Upper House to make suggestions for the amendment of money Bills. One would have expected that after the experience we had of the working of this provision, the Premier would have left it out of the Bill.

THE PREMIER: It was the existing law, and he thought it was a good law. It was also in the Federal Constitution Act.

Clause passed.

Clause 60—Dissolution of both Houses on rejection by one House of Bill twice passed by the other House:

THE PREMIER: Clauses 60 to 63, inclusive, providing for joint sittings, were known as the deadlock provisions, and dealt with a strongly-controverted question. In Australian constitutional history occasional deadlocks had arisen between two Houses, and had sometimes been pushed to extremes. In New South Wales and Queensland deadlocks would have been more frequent save that the Upper House was nominated, and therefore amenable to Government control. Deadlocks had arisen principally in Victoria, Tasmania, and South Australia, where there were elective Upper Chambers, the fact of election giving the members a certain strength not possessed by nominees. The scheme contained in this clause had often been suggested, and was substantially the same as the deadlock provisions in the Commonwealth Constitution. At the Melbourne Convention, to secure the adhesion of New South Wales an amendment was agreed to decreasing the majority from a three-fifths to an absolute majority; but it did not appear that the deadlock provisions in the Federal Constitution had met with strong opposition since their adoption, nor even that they were adversely criticised. In States with

elected Upper Houses there had been more or less bitter conflicts between the two branches of the Legislature, sometimes to the injury of constitutional government and the material interests of the State. In amending the Constitution our first duty was to make provision for meeting difficulties which, as they had arisen in most if not all States similarly constituted, were likely sooner or later to arise here. Because our two Houses had worked smoothly together in the past, we could not assume they would always work smoothly in future. In the past, legislation had reference mainly to our loan and public works policy; little of it had been contentious; and that little, in comparison with loan legislation, had been so insignificant as to be almost forgotten; while in connection with the loan policy there grew up such a strong personal feeling in favour of Sir John Forrest that members of the Upper House often suspended their judgment, and accepted, on his personal suggestion, many Bills they would not have accepted on the suggestion of any other Premier. Owing to that personal influence the difficulties experienced elsewhere had hitherto been avoided here; but in its absence we should be wise to make provision to meet those difficulties, being assured that our conditions being the same as those of the States where they had arisen, they must ultimately be faced by us; and we should therefore by these provisions anticipate them, and prevent trouble. It was complained, perhaps rightly, that Lower Houses were often wanting in a sense of responsibility, because in all legislation the Upper Houses had the final word. Here, and throughout Australia, it was said that Bills were passed by the Lower House without any intention of seeing them become Acts of Parliament.

MR. MORAN: In order to protest against this important discussion going on in the absence of a quorum, he drew attention to the State of the House. The small attendance was not complimentary to the Premier.

[Bells rung and quorum formed.]

THE PREMIER: It was said the Lower House shirked the real responsibility and threw it on the Upper Chamber. Believing that the Upper Chamber constituted a certain obstacle to the attainment of the main principles of a Bill, Assembly members voted for the measure in the sure and certain hope of its rejection by the Council. This want of a full sense of responsibility in the minds of Assembly members was often held up as one of the greatest difficulties in the adoption of the unicameral system in Australia. By these clauses the Assembly would be prevented from shirking its responsibility in that manner, and from trusting to the Legislative Council to throw out a Bill. By the Assembly every Bill must be given adequate consideration, and responsibility accepted whether the Bill passed or failed to pass the Council; because here was provided a method by which the Assembly, if determined to pass a Bill and prepared to face the country, had an opportunity of placing that Bill on the statute-book. Members here could not then claim to be powerless because of obstacles placed before them by the Council. It was provided that if either House passed a Bill and the other House rejected or failed to pass it, or passed it with amendments which were not agreed to, and if after an interval of three months the originating Chamber, in the next session, passed the Bill again, and it was again rejected or not passed by the other House, then the Governor should have power to dissolve simultaneously both Council and Assembly. Suppose a Bill was first introduced in the Assembly and sent to the Council for approval, and the Council refused to pass it, or suggested amendments with which the Assembly did not concur, as the law stood to-day such a Bill became waste paper; but by this clause the Bill could be brought up next session, and its second rejection by the Council would put the Governor in the position, on the advice of the Executive, to dissolve both Houses. There would be a joint dissolution; consequently the Upper House would hesitate to reject a Bill unless certain that they had behind them their electors. If they took up such a position that their continued resistance would lead to a dissolution, they would naturally make certain of re-election. Thus there was thrown on Council and Assembly alike a sense of responsibility which would go far to remove many of the objections now urged against Lower Houses. If

the Assembly introduced a Bill and wished it made law, the object could be secured so long as the electors returned to Parliament a majority favouring the Bill. The clause placed in the hands of the majority passing a Bill the power to insist on the measure becoming law, the only condition being that before there could be a joint sitting there must be a general election; and by means of a general election the electors could decide whether the Council or the Assembly was right. After the dissolution the Assembly could again forward the Bill to the Council, and if the Council failed to agree to it a joint sitting of members of both Houses was convened. Clauses 62 and 63 dealt with that joint sitting, and provided that the Bill should be taken at the joint sitting, and members of both Houses should deliberate and vote together, and deal with the questions the same as they would in one House; and any amendments which were not affirmed by a three-fifths majority of the total number of members of the Assembly and Council combined, present and voting, would not be carried. There were in the two Houses 80 members, and three-fifths of that number would be 48. There would have to be a majority of 48 members before amendments were affirmed and passed, and that could only arise in this way, that either the Lower House would have to be absolutely unanimous, or there would have to be a majority of the Lower House with a considerable strengthening of the Upper House to enable the Government to secure a three-fifths majority.

MR. DAGLISH: It would never be obtained.

THE PREMIER: It would, he thought. A large majority such as that would have to be obtained to make sure that the rights of the minority were not lightly overridden. It was not so much what would happen; it was not so much whether a three-fifths majority would be easy or difficult to obtain; but it was the fact that while the proposal existed on the statute-book it would throw on members a full sense of responsibility for the action they took. And these difficulties would in a great majority of cases not occur: they would melt away. By providing machinery for the settlement of disputes, very often disputes were prevented. How frequently disputes arose because trouble could be occasioned! We passed law not so much to punish the offence as t deter people from committing offences and the same principle could be applie in regard to other matters. By passing a law which provided for the settlemen of these difficulties, it threw on one o two Houses the responsibility and ulti mate punishment of going to the country and it would tend to check the difficulties from arising. These provisions would deter both Houses from creating difficul ties. At present what did the Assembly suffer if it passed a Bill that might b rejected by the Council? Member went to the country and said, "I wa prepared to support that class of legis lation; I believe in it; there is the Bil we passed; but the other House rejected it." These provisions would deter mem bers from saying that, because the nex session the Bill could be introduced again and the joint sitting resorted to. I members wished now to shield them selves under the Legislative Council there was that reply. Members o the Legislative Council could not under this amendment say, "My 'yes' or 'no is the last word." They would have to deal with a Bill with a sense of re sponsibility impressed on them. When they recognised the machinery under the clause they would know that their "yes" or "no" was not the last word. He thought a useful operation would be found in the deterrent effect of the provision and the increased responsibility which it gave the Lower House in dealing with Bills. The Assembly too frequently shielded itself behind the plea that the Upper House rejected a measure.

MR. MORAN: On questions of this kind there should be intelligent discussion in a full House. This subject when introduced in the Federal Parliament was thought worthy of discussion by the greatest minds in Australia. It was the duty of the Upper House when the Constitution Bill, the Redistribution of Seats Bill, and the other Bills came before them, to pass them out because of the entire lack of interest displayed by the rank and file of the Lower House. Now was the time for the Upper House to say these changes were not asked for by the country, since only on the motion of a member of the Opposition could a quorum be obtained in the Lower House when

these Bills were going through. He urged the Upper House to throw the measures out. It would be better for Western Australia that these changes should be proposed in the next session, when members would be nearer a general election, despite anything which Parliament might do in itself. Discussion of these measures should take place with due deliberation and in a full House. Such was his belief in the general perfection of the British Constitution in all its branches, that he did not think legislation of this kind should pass the first time it was introduced. After the Federal movement he was in dread of popular waves of enthusiasm. He thought more than he used to do of the locks and bars placed on Parliament so that matters should not be unduly rushed through. He might be a growing conservative, but it was a conservatism of growing conviction. If the Upper House passed the Bill as sent up, he would come to the conclusion that there was no need for an Upper Chamber in Western Australia; and he should be the first to advocate the remodelling of the Constitution and the abolition of the Upper House; perhaps making the franchise for the Lower House a little bit different, not on manhood suffrage alone, and not altogether on a population basis. If a measure like this was passed through with a bare quorum, and the Upper House passed it without sending it back and asking if the Assembly was in earnest, then he would advocate a change of the Constitution. If he were a member of the Upper House and this Bill were sent up, he would say "Am I to accept it as the will of the people because 14 members voted for it?" The Premier brought forward these measures with a view of having them discussed. He could not help it if they were not discussed; he was not responsible for the entire emptiness of the Opposition benches or the scanty appearance of the Government cross-benches. Would the Premier be satisfied if this Bill was carried into law by the small number of members present? Would not the Premier rather have the Bill sent back and go to the country on it, and say "I am in favour of the change; I would like to know what the country thinks about it." In spite of what might be said about redistribution, it was the absolute duty of the Upper House to pass the Bills out even without discussion at all. Members of the Upper House had only to watch the lack of interest in the discussion displayed in the Assembly. The Premier and he (Mr. Moran) were doing what appeared to them to be their duty in encouraging discussion. There had been no necessity for a joint sitting of the two Houses in the past, and the clause contained a most imperfect provision for the object which it sought to attain. There was to be a three-fifths majority of the members present, and one must assume that the full number of members would be present, because there would only be a joint sitting on big public questions. Supposing we were passing a law which very largely affected property, or a question which might come in a very short time, the abolition of the bicameral system, a majority of 48 members would have to be obtained before any question could be carried at the joint sitting. It would only require three members of the Lower House to stay away or to vote against the Lower House to defeat the Lower House at the joint sitting! The Assembly must be unanimous if we were striking a blow at the life of another Chamber, or there must be willing hands in the other Chamber who were desirous of committing suicide. In the case of a double dissolution, members of the Upper House would not go back to the same electors as members of this House would have to do, but would go back to different electors under a different franchise; and the members of that other House might be sent back stronger than before on the particular question, so that if a three-fifths majority could not be obtained in the joint sitting to support the particular measure, and if there were not that safeguard which operated at present, namely the moral suasion and good sense of the two Houses which had always been successful in carrying the most democratic legislation in the past, this plan proposed by the Premier would not work. He denied the statement of the Premier that we in this State had been principally engaged in carrying out a loan policy. On the contrary, in no part of Australia had such progress been made in democratic legislation as in Western Australia during the last 12

years. The Premier failed to recognise the splendid progress which had been made under our Constitution. We were ahead of all other Australian States in many things, and were behind them in none. Conciliation and arbitration had been passed in this State; our franchise had been made as liberal as in any other State; and we were as much advanced in social legislation, the latest evidence of that being the passing of a Factories and Shops Bill now practically finished in this House. Our Legislative Council, instead of being an obstructive body, had kept step for step with the Lower House in progressive legislation. Had he been a member of the Cabinet at the present time, he would not have been willing to introduce legislation dealing with the relations of the two Houses. When that question had to be dealt with in future, it would be dealt with as a part of the bicameral system of government, as part of a revision of the theory of government. The lack of interest now shown in this House strengthened his opposition to the passing of legislation of this kind. Therefore, he considered that any member of the Upper House who did not use his opportunity to stop this legislation or check it would not be entitled to a vote from him or from any elector of the Upper House. It was the duty of the Upper House in this instance to send back legislation of this kind, when those members knew it had been put through this House while the attendances were so thin as at present. No harm could be done by starting the discussion of these changes, but great harm might be done if these changes were passed through both Houses without adequate discussion.

MR. DAGLISH: While not agreeing entirely with the arguments of the hon. member, he did agree with his conclusion that this clause was not a good one. If the principle were good, then the subsequent clauses relating to its operation would destroy the effect of it. He did not think this was the only way of settling disputes between the two Houses. As to the example of the Federal Parliament in regard to the holding of joint sittings, the Premier had omitted to state that the franchise for the two Federal Houses was approximately the same, and that only the electorates were different.

THE PREMIER: If they appealed to exactly the same electorates and to the same electors, there would be no need for a joint sitting of the Houses.

MR. DAGLISH: Another point was that if a dispute arose, the handiest way of settlement would be to refer the question to the electors; and if reference were to be made to two classes of electors, that could be done by taking a referendum of Council electors and a referendum of Assembly electors, both on the same day; and we should then have the opinions of the electors on the question without the personal element being involved in the struggle. Would the vote of each member in each House of Parliament be the same on all occasions, if members knew that the vote might precipitate a dissolution? We knew that Governments elsewhere had continued to hold power by holding a threat of dissolution over members of the Assembly. It would be better to have a deadlock than to have dishonesty in legislation by the votes of members being influenced by an impending dissolution. Another point was the time involved in getting a settlement of any dispute between the two Houses. If the two Houses disagreed, say in November, the matter must come up again before both Houses in the next session of Parliament; and if after both Houses had again considered the circumstances and again disagreed, only then could a reference to the country be made. If the Assembly were then 12 months off a dissolution, no reference could be made; so that this provision could only prevent deadlocks occurring some 18 months before the time for dissolving a triennial Parliament. This would mean that the particular dispute must occur in the first session of the parliamentary term, because the principle at issue must be affirmed in two succeeding sessions. The Premier by this proposal would absolutely postpone the settlement of any difficulty if it occurred in the latter half of the parliamentary term. The Legislative Assembly might be twice dissolved in six months, if the Council chose to disagree with the Assembly. The heavier expense of fighting elections for the Upper House would have its effect on members of that House in giving their votes on questions likely to cause a serious difference between the two Houses. We ought to have a simpler way of settling

disputes, and for this purpose he urged the referendum as a simpler way. Better than a double dissolution would be a double referendum to the two classes of electors. If there were a double dissolution, what guarantee would there be of getting the necessary majority as the result of it? There would have to be a unanimous Assembly; or failing that, in order to make up the 48 members required to settle a dispute in a joint sitting, 30 out of 50 members in this House would have to vote in one way, and in the other House 18 out of 30 would have to vote in the one way.

THE PREMIER: With the dissolution there would be the joint sitting. If you could not get a three-fifths majority, why should you force the measure on a minority of two-fifths?

MR. DAGLISH: Supposing members representing all the populous districts were by overwhelming majorities returned to advocate an innovation, and country members were returned by small majorities to oppose it, the agricultural interest would preponderate in the Council.

THE PREMIER: No. In the other House were nine goldfields members and nine representing the metropolitan area.

MR. DAGLISH: The metropolitan members frequently supported the agricultural interest; therefore though four-fifths of the population voted for a measure, it would still be possible for the two Houses, sitting jointly, to decide contrary to the wishes of that majority.

THE PREMIER: That was only a possibility.

MR. DAGLISH: As likely to be realised as the possibilities submitted by the Premier. This provision might well be excised.

MR. HASTIE: The last two speakers had not shown what would probably take place if a Bill were not passed and there were no provision in case of a deadlock. The member for West Perth asked that the clause be struck out, thus providing that 13 members of the future Legislative Council could block whatever legislation they chose. This could now be done by 16 Councillors.

MR. MORAN: For that purpose the Upper House existed.

MR. HASTIE: Did the Council exist to prevent the Assembly from passing legislation?

MR. MORAN: No.

MR. HASTIE: The hon. member had said so. Apparently he wished the Assembly to remain at the mercy of the Council. He (Mr. Hastie) would support a proposal for a referendum, or for a similar provision. The clause was one means of meeting an evil, and its opponents should propose an alternative. We should soon have to face an Upper House elected on a franchise more liberal than that of any other State save South Australia, and the more liberal the franchise the stronger the House. Nominee Houses were the most pliable; therefore the new Council would not always agree to measures passed by us, and deadlocks must be anticipated. As the law stood the Upper House were never dissolved, and could not be influenced by a threat of dissolution. To avoid dissolution they would often modify their proposals. Though the clause seemed far too cumbrous, requiring too much time to attain the object sought, it was a great improvement on the present system.

MR. MORAN: Why?

MR. HASTIE: Because we were now absolutely in the power of any 16 Councillors.

MR. MORAN: Pass the clause, and we should be absolutely in the power of three Assembly members.

MR. HASTIE: Even so, the Assembly members must face the electors, and when returned would doubtless vote as directed by them. The hon. member wished the present state of affairs to be permanent. Several members maintained that this clause strengthened the Council, but no reason was stated. An absolute power could not be strengthened. He favoured the abolition of the Council; but as that was unattainable he preferred its being elected on the Assembly franchise rather than on a special property qualification. There should certainly be some provision for a conference between the Houses.

MR. MORAN: Did the hon. member maintain that by passing this Bill the Assembly would have a greater power over the Upper House?

MR. HASTIE: Certainly, assuming the measure passed the Upper House. The clause was good so far as it went: he regretted it did not go farther. For a three-fifths majority an ordinary majority should be substituted.

Fear of a dissolution would make members of both Houses glad to modify their opinions in accordance with the wishes of their constituents.

MR. BATH: Like the last speaker he maintained the Upper House might disappear without detriment to the community; but in default of that the Assembly should at least be paramount, and the provisions of this clause would tend to promote rather than prevent deadlocks. As both Federal Houses were elected on an equal franchise, there was no great danger to the House of Representatives in a double dissolution, because the electors' votes had equal weight for both Chambers, the voters could decide which House was right, and the verdict would be satisfactory to the general community. But here, if the Council threw out a Bill passed by the Assembly, and a double dissolution followed, the House elected on a property franchise would be strengthened in its position because some of its electors could vote for the Assembly also, while few Assembly electors had the Council franchise. So that the Council would come back materially strengthened, while the Assembly would be materially weakened thereby. He favoured the proposal that if the Assembly passed a measure and it was submitted to the Council who threw it out, and the measure was brought up again in the Assembly in the next session and re-passed by that body, such measure should become the law of the land, by the fact of the Assembly re-passing it after having time to reconsider their former decision. He had long favoured the idea of having one House, with a number of the members elected by the whole of the electors of the State. It had been pointed out that three members of the Assembly could influence the decision on a joint sitting. It would be necessary to have 48 members in favour of a proposal before it became law. Where the two Houses met together there would be an opportunity for a general discussion free from prejudices which members generally held in favour of their own House; because it must be recognised the Council and Assembly, as in other States, were very solicitous about their privileges and did not like any interference from the other branch of the Legislature. If members sat together they would be compelled to discuss questions and arrive at an intelligent decision easier than by the circuitous proposal embodied in the measure. He would support the striking out of the clause.

MR. DAGLISH: It was impossible when dealing with the clause to introduce a referendum proposal in the shape of a concrete motion, because members must be aware that in the event of the clause being rejected it would be impossible for any member to introduce another proposal to deal with deadlocks: any new proposal would have to be brought forward when dealing with new clauses. He was willing to accept the assurance of the member for Hannans that he would oppose the clause in favour of a referendum, and he (Mr. Daglish) would propose a suitable clause to meet that member's wishes if the present clause were struck out.

MR. HASTIE: The advice of the member for Subiaco could not be accepted. There was nothing to prevent the hon. member proposing an amendment now, and there was no chance of a referendum being carried. The clause went a long way beyond the present condition of affairs.

Clause put, and a division taken with the following result:—

Ayes	...	...	18
Noes	...	...	8
Majority for	...	...	10

AYES.	NOES.
Mr. Atkins	Mr. Bath
Mr. Diamond	Mr. Butcher
Mr. Ewing	Mr. Daglish
Mr. Foulkes	Mr. Holman
Mr. Gardiner	Mr. Johnson
Mr. Gordon	Mr. O'Connor
Mr. Gregory	Mr. Taylor
Mr. Hastie	Mr. Moran (*Teller*).
Mr. Hopkins	
Mr. Jacoby	
Mr. James	
Mr. Kingsmill	
Mr. Nanson	
Mr. Oats	
Mr. Rason	
Mr. Reid	
Mr. Wallace	
Mr. Higham (*Teller*).	

Clause thus passed.

Clauses 61, 62—agreed to.

Clause 63—Bill passed by three-fifths majority at a joint sitting of both Houses to be deemed passed by both Houses:

MR. DAGLISH moved that in line 2 of Subclause 2 the words "of at least three-fifths" be struck out.

Amendment negatived.

MR. HASTIE: At the joint sitting must members agree to the Bill as it was then brought before members, or was there power to amend that Bill.

THE PREMIER: The Bill was then supposed to have the sanction of the general election behind it.

MR. HASTIE: It would be a good thing if the Bill could be amended at such a sitting.

THE PREMIER: That would hardly be fair. The object of the clause was to insure that the Bill had been fully discussed and ventilated; all clauses having received full consideration inside the House as well as outside. In the case of a Bill likely to go through this process all the important clauses would have been discussed, not once but half-a-dozen times, and it would not be right at the last moment to bring forward an amendment which had not been considered by the two Houses separately or by the country. The joint sitting was for the purpose of settling existing differences, those which arose under a certain Bill. We would exhaust, before the sitting was held, all the points in dispute.

Clause passed.

Clause 64—Salary of President and Speaker:

MR. MORAN: All agreed that the President of the Legislative Council did not earn the money that the Speaker of the Assembly did, and we should not have ornamental salaries. He moved that the clause be struck out.

Amendment put, and a division taken with the following result.

Ayes	...	...	12
Noes	...	...	15
Majority against		...	3

AYES.	NOES.
Mr. Bath	Mr. Atkins
Mr. Daglish	Mr. Butcher
Mr. Hastie	Mr. Ewing
Mr. Holman	Mr. Foulkes
Mr. Jacoby	Mr. Gardiner
Mr. Johnson	Mr. Gordon
Mr. Moran	Mr. Gregory
Mr. Nanson	Mr. Hopkins
Mr. Oats	Mr. James
Mr. Reid	Mr. Kingsmill
Mr. Taylor	Mr. Monger
Mr. Diamond (*Teller*).	Mr. O'Connor
	Mr. Rason
	Mr. Wallace
	Mr. Higham (*Teller*).

Amendment thus negatived.

Clause put and passed.

Clause 65—agreed to.

Clause 66—Allowance to Members:

MR. BUTCHER moved that the clause be struck out. He intended to divide the Committee if he could get another voice to support him. Labour members might consider this amendment was directed against them; but nothing was farther from his intention. If the amendment were carried it would benefit the Labour members by doing away with the chance of the professional politician, who went before the country as a candidate professing to adopt the Labour platform, and, having got elected on that, he would enter the House and throw over those who elected him. It would also give to the Labour organisations the opportunity of paying their own representatives, and in that way getting direct representation.

MR. HOLMAN: Did the hon. member pay his wages-men enough to keep a member of this House?

MR. BUTCHER said he paid every one of his wages-men more than was paid to an artisan or mechanic in an industrial district.

Amendment negatived.

THE PREMIER said he intended to move for striking out certain words which made the allowance £200 a year, with a view of removing the amount from the Constitution Bill and placing it in a separate measure, as he had proposed to do in reference to other changeable matter.

MR. MORAN: Then the Premier would dodge the question altogether for this session?

THE PREMIER: The question could be tested if it were desired, but he wished only to remove changeable matter from this Bill.

MR. MORAN moved, as an amendment in the first line, that the words "Council and of the" be struck out, with a view of inserting words for reducing the allowance of members of the Council to £100. His object was to keep the salary of members of the Lower House the same as at present, but to make the salary of members of the Upper House exactly one-half. No one could deny that members of the Assembly, and particularly those who attended to the work, did at least double the amount of work as compared with members of the Council, while the work of this Chamber altogether was four or five times more than

the work performed by the Council. Besides this difference, members of the Assembly had all the work of their constituences to do. Now that we were talking of economy, this was the first step he would take by beginning high up and going right down.

MR. HASTIE: How could we get an amendment on the amount of allowance to members?

THE PREMIER: The question of the amount could be dealt with in a separate Bill.

Amendment (to strike out words relating to the Council) put, and a division taken with the following result:—

Ayes	...	...	10
Noes	...	...	14
Majority against		...	4

AYES.	NOES.
Mr. Diamond	Mr. Atkins
Mr. Foulkes	Mr. Bath
Mr. Hastie	Mr. Daglish
Mr. Hopkins	Mr. Gordon
Mr. Mouger	Mr. Gregory
Mr. Moran	Mr. Holman
Mr. Nanson	Mr. James
Mr. Oats	Mr. Johnson
Mr. O'Connor	Mr. Kingsmill
Mr. Jacoby (*Teller*).	Mr. Rason
	Mr. Reid
	Mr. Taylor
	Mr. Wallace
	Mr. Higham (*Teller*).

Amendment thus negatived.

THE PREMIER moved that all the words after "received," in Subclause 1, line 3, be struck out, and "such allowances as Parliament may determine" inserted in lieu. This would leave the remuneration of members to be decided by Parliament.

MR. HOPKINS: If salaries were not fixed by the Constitution Act, payment of members would become a burning question at every election. Each Assembly member should draw £300 a year, and be fined £2 10s. for every sitting day on which he absented himself. Moreover, members travelling within the limits of the State, by boat or coach to or from their constituencies, should have their fares paid by the Government. To the Kimberley, Dundas, and Pilbarra members this would specially appeal; for members who reached their constituencies by rail now had their fares paid. If the fines he proposed had been inflicted during the present session, and the salary had been £300, the member for East Kimberley, instead of drawing £66 13s. 4d. for four months, would owe the State £2 10s.; he (Mr. Hopkins), instead of drawing £66 13s. 4d. would draw £47 10s.; the member for North Perth would be in debt £7 10s.; the member for Subiaco would have drawn £100 instead of £66 13s. 4d.; the member for North Fremantle £25; and the member for East Fremantle——

MR. MORAN: Why not make allowance for illness?

MR. HOPKINS: Yes; on production of a medical certificate. In this computation he had not allowed for his own illness. Other members would be paid as follow:—Wellington, £10; Greenough, £42 10s.; West Perth, £72 10s.; the leader of the Opposition, the full amount of £100; the Moore, £92 10s.; and Sussex, £87 10s. To secure attendance, fines must be inflicted.

MR. NANSON opposed the Premier's amendment, for which sufficient reasons had not been given. It would allow Parliament to determine at the beginning of every session what remuneration members should receive, and the salaries might be largely increased.

THE MINISTER FOR MINES: Only by Act of Parliament, and provision could be made that the Act should not take effect till after a general election.

MR. NANSON: There was no reason why salaries should not be fixed in the Constitution Act.

MR. DIAMOND supported the amendment. The House must ultimately decide on its own remuneration, and the safeguard suggested would be sufficient. There was no reason to fear a fresh discussion each session, nor that this would become a burning question at every general election.

MR. MORAN: The salaries should be fixed by the Act. Many members did not care whose salary they reduced provided they could increase their own. He would oppose any increase. The country was not getting £200 worth of work out of every member; and it might pay to close the House for 10 years and remunerate members for absenting themselves. The proposal of the member for Boulder was absurd. Many members attended at each sitting, nodded to the Sergeant-at-Arms, and disappeared. The attendances as recorded were most misleading. The men who worked hardest

and those who attended oftenest were not identical. What was the value of regular but momentary attendance in comparison with the hard work of those occasionally absent? In his own case, he did 10 times more work than many who attended constantly.

Mr. HOPKINS: It could be provided that they should attend and take part in every division.

MR MORAN: That would mean providing bearers and a stretcher to carry members in from the Refreshment Room every time there was a division. He did not mind being paid by the folio. All these suggestions had been tried in every Parliament in Australia and found impracticable. Payment of members was supposed to be a compassionate allowance to unfortunate men to put up with the ups and downs of political life. The electors of Kimberley would thank Mr. Connor for being away trying to open up a market for cattle in South Africa. There was something in the fact that the State provided railways for a majority of members to go to their electorates, and the same argument might be used in favour of allowing members fares to their constituencies where there was no railway. Then there might be a difficulty because many members in Perth represented outside electorates; still members were expected to go to their electorates once a year to have a look round. It was true every time a member travelled on the railways his fare was paid. There was something in the system as adopted by the Federal Parliament that the representatives of districts far away should have their fares paid. When members saw and knew the State, better legislation resulted.

THE PREMIER: There was a separate Bill conferring payment of members. If the question of payment of members was so pressing, discussion could not be avoided. He admitted there was a good deal to be said in favour of retaining the clause, but it was one of those matters which, from a draftsman's point of view, should not be in the Bill.

MR. MORAN: As there was an Act dealing with payment of members, the clause was redundant.

THE PREMIER: With permission, he would withdraw the amendment and look into the matter.

Amendment withdrawn.

MR. HOPKINS: If the clause stood, would the amount of payment be £200 a year?

THE PREMIER: The amount could not be increased by members.

MR. HOPKINS: It could be struck out, and then members would see what the Government would do.

Clause passed.

Clause 67—Ministers of the Crown:

MR. MORAN: It was his intention to move in the direction of having six executive officers of the State. If Ministers attended to their departments as the present Ministers were doing, there was plenty of work for six. He would rather see the salaries of Ministers fixed at £800 a year and have six, than that the salary should be £1,000 a year with only five. £800 a year was fair payment for a Minister of the Crown, who was not called on to give four times more time to the State than a private member was. He (Mr. Moran) gave considerably more than half his time during the year to his duties as a member of Parliament. He always found that Parliament in and out of session took up one-half of his time. That might be because he had represented large electorates and widely scattered districts; but now that he represented West Perth, his parliamentary duties took up certainly more than half his time, and while Parliament was sitting they took up the whole of his time. Whenever he was in Perth, he was in his place in the House from half-past 2 o'clock till the House rose. He was never in the Refreshment Room. Members did not find him away when discussions were on. Ministers did not devote such a great deal more of their time to the affairs of State than private members, because Ministers had their private interests to look after as well as other members had.

MR. FOULKES: The reason the clause had been inserted was no doubt that of a sense of modesty on the part of Ministers, and it was left to the House to decide how many Ministers there should be. It was most important we should keep the present number of Ministers. It was considered ten years ago that six Ministers were not too many, and at that time there was only a population of 40,000 people. Now there was a population of over

200,000 people, roughly speaking, and the population was rapidly increasing. He declined to look at the question from an economical point of view. He felt certain if the departments were well administered that was the proper way to secure economy. During the short time he had been in Parliament he was struck by the way in which Ministers had worked. All must agree that Ministers had devoted a great deal of their time to parliamentary work. They had worked exceedingly hard, and he knew that some of them during the last three months had worked from 8 o'clock in the morning until 11 or 12 at night. The population was increasing and the different departments were increasing: he did not know what proportion the civil servants bore to the number ten years ago, but he would say that at least there was double the number, and the greater supervision the civil servants had, the better for the State. He did not know which particular Minister it was proposed to dispense with: he was sure there was not a single department which would be improved by having its Minister taken away.

MR. MORAN: All could be dispensed with.

MR. FOULKES: One would like to know whom the member for West Perth would put in their places.

MR. MORAN: Put them out first, and consider that question afterwards.

MR. FOULKES: Having a certain amount of caution, he would like to know whom the member for West Perth would suggest to replace the present Ministers. The lightest department was perhaps that presided over by the Colonial Secretary, but that was a department in which there was room for a tremendous amount of work. The hospital question was an important one and would take up a great deal of time to properly deal with. If we reduced the number of Ministers, it would be an admission that we did not think the country was progressing. Even if Ministers were increased to seven, the expense would be amply repaid, and it was more important to have sufficient Ministers to look after the several departments than to save a small sum of money.

MR. DIAMOND supported the amendment. In a rising community, with such enormous territory and variety of interests, six Ministers would find it all they could do to carry on the work. A far as the work was concerned, the mem ber for West Perth (Mr. Moran) lo sight of the fact that Ministers had work all the year, while ordinary mem bers of the House worked only durin the session. He was not in favour reducing the number of Ministers, reducing the amount of salary to Minister

THE TREASURER: In this matte his colleagues might perhaps blame hi for the proposed reduction in the numb of Ministers. His opinion was, afte observing the working of the systen that five Ministers would be sufficien when the work of the several depar ments reached a normal condition. Th time had come when it was not practi able for a man to perform the duties of Minister and at the same time look afte his own business. If every Ministe gave the whole of his time to the work which must eventually settle down an could not go on with a big strain, h thought five Ministers would be sufficien

MR. MORAN: Did the Treasurer d this himself?

THE TREASURER: Having state his reasons for making the suggestio he thought it could be carried ou If the salaries payable to members Parliament for political duties wer being reduced, it would be fair also t reduce the salaries paid to Ministers but that was not the question at presen As to the ability of Ministers to do th work, the Minister for Mines, for instanc with his energy might relieve the Colonia Secretary of some departmental work and the Colonial Secretary could in tur take over some of the work of othe departments. In the Treasury he ha found that he could keep up with th work, and he thought that under norma conditions he could do some additiona work. Of course a Minister could no do this if he also gave attention to hi private business.

MR. MORAN: The Treasurer had no been long enough in office to know muc about the work.

MR. NANSON: While strongly i favour of the clause as it stood, he recog nised that in a year or so the question o economy would be a big and burnin question throughout the country, an then it would be found that man members who were now talking abou

decreasing the expenditure would then be only too willing, in obedience to the views of their constituents, to do as they were told. The member for Claremont (MR. Foulkes) took the mistaken view that there could not be efficiency without paying big salaries. In England, where the salaries of Ministers were much larger than in Australia, no one supposed that efficiency depended on the amount of a salary paid. He did not suppose that the efficiency would be increased or diminished by the difference between £800 and £1,000 in this State; and although Ministers often did things which he thought were opposed to the best interests of the country, he always recognised their honesty and their patriotic motives. Ultimately it would be found that five Ministers would be ample, and that a Ministerial salary of £800 a year would be sufficient, with the addition perhaps of another £200 as the payment for members. In this State we had to get rid of the idea of big expenditure, and come down from Australian extravagance to the Canadian model of economy. That was beginning to be practised in Victoria and in South Australia, owing to the irresistible demand for retrenchment. It would be better in this State, and would create a better feeling abroad, if before pressure was felt from outside we realised that in this huge territory there was profitable employment for every pound we could spare by more economical expenditure, and that we could employ the money saved in developing the resources of the country. Taking the aggregate of all the suggested savings, there would be a considerable sum available for helping to develop the country. Every thousand pounds saved would be diverted into a channel where it could be beneficially employed. It was impossible to start reform in the civil service unless we set an example by beginning reductions in the cost of Parliament and in the Ministerial salaries so as to recognise the necessity for retrenchment; and in his opinion the salaries paid to Ministers should be regarded only as some partial compensation for the sacrifices which Ministers had to make. Any man who went into public life at the present time must be prepared to make sacrifices, because members of this House earned certainly less in their capacity as members than they could earn if they left politics altogether. He trusted that the clause would be allowed to stand, and of course members of the Government should be in the best position to judge whether reduction in the number of Ministers would be practicable and safe.

At 6·30, the CHAIRMAN left the Chair.
At 7·30, Chair resumed.

MR. MORAN: The absence of the leader of the Opposition was regrettable, as that hon. member would have voted with him on the score of economy. The object of the amendment was to appoint five Ministers at £800, and a Premier receiving £1,000 a year; thus, the total of the salaries carried by portfolios would be £5,000, representing a saving of £1,200 on the present expenditure while securing equal efficiency.

MR. DAGLISH: Even if the amendment were carried, it would not be obligatory on a Premier to include six Ministers in his Cabinet. The Governor had power to appoint any less number. At the same time, power existed to retain the number of Ministers at its present strength until such time as the State departments were thoroughly organised. At this juncture any reduction in the number of Ministers would be rather a dangerous experiment. Curtailment of expense could be carried to such a fine point that true economy would be sacrificed. Great need still existed for members of even this Ministry to get a firmer grip of their departments. Ministers should acquire such knowledge that they would be competent to act without invariably following the suggestions and recommendations of permanent heads of departments. The practice of using a Minister simply as a machine to indorse the recommendations of departmental heads was the greatest evil under which this country suffered at the present time. There was little hope of the money spent on the Public Service Royal Commission relieving Ministers of the necessity of acquainting themselves with the administration of their respective departments. In the circumstances, the safest course was to support the amendment.

MR. HOPKINS said that he had on the Notice Paper an amendment proposing reduction of the number of Ministers to four.

THE CHAIRMAN: That amendment could be moved after the word "five" had been struck out.

Amendment ("six" in lieu of "five") put and passed.

Clause as amended agreed to.

Clauses 68, 69—agreed to.

Clause 70—Amount payable out of Consolidated Revenue Fund:

MR. MORAN: Were the Committee unanimous on retaining in this Bill a clause providing that the salary of the Governor should not be increased or diminished during his term of office?

THE MINISTER FOR MINES: Yes. The matter was of great importance.

MR. MORAN: One could scarcely imagine a Government proposing to reduce the salary of a Governor during his term of office.

THE PREMIER: The salary could not be increased, either.

MR. DAGLISH: The second paragraph of this clause was absolutely valueless, because Parliament would not think of reducing a Governor's salary while he held office. At the same time, there was no possible hope of stopping increases of salary by means of the paragraph. A case in point had occurred last session, the Government bringing down a proposal to increase the Governor's salary by an amount of £2,000 to be granted in the form of an entertainment allowance. While that sort of thing could be done——

THE PREMIER: Would not the fact of the paragraph standing here create a strong position for opposing increases, as being against the spirit of the Constitution Act?

MR. DAGLISH: If increases in the Governor's salary were proposed under the designation of "allowances," there was not the slightest hope of Parliament rejecting them. The most plausible reasons were always advanced in favour of such "allowances."

THE PREMIER: But there was the experience of the Commonwealth Parliament.

MR. DAGLISH: The paragraph would be effective only in respect of diminution; so that there would never be power to reduce, but always power to increase. He moved that the paragraph be struck out.

THE PREMIER: It was to be hoped that the clause would pass as printed. By excising the proviso, we should be reserving to ourselves the right to repudiate a contract; and that surely was a position we ought not to take. The Governor was appointed on a fixed salary, and that salary he had a right to expect to receive during his whole term of office. It was hardly to be thought that we should ever go the length of attempting to diminish the salary, because obviously we ought to pay it in full. Therefore, no real objection existed to the paragraph. If there were in point of fact any possibility of our attempting to reduce the salary during the Governor's term of office, then there was urgent reason why the paragraph should stand.

Amendment negatived, and the clause agreed to.

Clauses 71 and 72—agreed to.

Clauses 1, 2 (postponed)—agreed to.

Clause 3 (postponed)—Interpretation:

MR. HOPKINS moved that line 3 of Clause 3, "'Council' means the Legislative Council" be struck out. He believed that with one House of Parliament we should have a better system of government than we possessed under existing circumstances, whereby members of this Chamber were especially invited to shirk their responsibilities and pass them on to another Chamber. It had been the rule that a candidate for one House was returned practically on the platform which made him eligible for the other House. We had, in addition to that, the expense incurred in maintaining the Legislative Council. If we had a return laid on the table showing that expense, we should probably find it reached not less than £15,000 a year, and very likely much more. If we had one Chamber of say 60 members, that would, he believed, answer the requirements of the country a great deal better than the existing method. It might be said that the Upper House was required as a means of checking hasty legislation, as a means of exercising a check on the ultra-radical desires of this House. If this House were a reflex of the people, and the constituencies were evenly distributed among the people, there might be some *bona fide* reason for bringing forward that contention; but we had a Legislative Assembly hedged round on every side by the most conservative principles, hedged round by a distribution of con-

stituencies whereby a single individual in one part of the country exercised a voting power equivalent to eight votes in another part. With all these safeguards it was not necessary to preserve the second Chamber. As the leader of the Opposition said last night, some of us were probably a bit before the times, but notwithstanding that, he believed the principle he was now advocating would in the near future be accepted not only here but very likely in all the States in Australia. The expense of maintaining the two Chambers seemed to him to be altogether excessive when compared with the population and requirements of the country. The fact that we had delegated to the Commonwealth the right and power to legislate on altogether 39 articles, more particularly the powers with regard to Customs and Excise, Posts and Telegraphs, and that there were great possibilities of Railways and other departments following at no very distant date, led one to the conclusion that if it was only in the interests of economy we might very well give consideration to this phase of the question. There was much that might be said on it. He had already in the debate on the second reading dealt to some extent with this question, and he did so again last night. It was not his desire to give a repetition of the remarks which had previously fallen from him, but he would simply formally move that line 3 of Clause 3 be struck out.

Amendment put, and a division taken with the following result:—

Ayes	...	...	8
Noes	...	...	22
Majority against	...		14

AYES.	NOES.
Mr. Bath	Mr. Atkins
Mr. Daglish	Mr. Doherty
Mr. Hastie	Mr. Foulkes
Mr. Holman	Mr. Gardiner
Mr. Hopkins	Mr. Gordon
Mr. Reid	Mr. Gregory
Mr. Taylor	Mr. Harper
Mr. Diamond (*Teller*).	Mr. Higham
	Mr. Jacoby
	Mr. James
	Mr. Kingsmill
	Mr. McDonald
	Mr. Monger
	Mr. O'Connor
	Mr. Phillips
	Mr. Piesse
	Mr. Purkiss
	Mr. Quinlan
	Mr. Rason
	Mr. Throssell
	Mr. Wallace
	Mr. Moran (*Teller*).

Amendment thus negatived.

MR. HOPKINS moved that the words "one-third," in line 4, be struck out and "one-half" inserted in lieu. The object was to have 12 constituencies, each returning two members, and periodical elections at which half the total number of members would be elected.

THE PREMIER: This was a good amendment, and he would accept it. In his opinion the only way in which we could overcome the difficulty arising from our enormous geographical area was to have a greater number of provinces, and secure that instead of having three members per province we should have two members per province. He saw no reason against that, whilst he could see a great number of reasons in favour of having more provinces than we had at present.

MR. MORAN: Did that mean that half of the members would go to the country every two years?

THE PREMIER: No; every three years. Instead of having an election once every two years, there would be an election once every three years, or it might be every four.

MR. MORAN: The object of the provision in the old Constitution Act, for a third of the members to go to the country every two years, was the precise object sought to be attained now by means of a joint sitting, namely to get an expression of public opinion; and whilst we had a provision now to avoid deadlocks and to get an expression of opinion through the Lower House, he did not think there was the slightest occasion for these rotatory elections.

THE PREMIER: Having periodical elections gave a continuity to an Upper House which characterised every Upper House.

MR. MORAN: The strongest argument in favour of the provision in the old Act was that every two years at least—and during that time nothing of great importance would crop up—we should get the opinion of the country on one-third of the members of the Upper House, and that was the point at which the Lower House and the people came into contact with the Upper House, if it was necessary to fight them.

THE PREMIER: We could make the Upper House election fall in with that of the Lower House.

MR. MORAN: That might or might not be a wise provision. There was not the same occasion now for these rotatory elections, as deadlock machinery was now provided.

MR. DAGLISH: The proposal of the Government was to still retain six years as the term for which the members of the Upper House were elected. The object of the mover, or at all events his (Mr. Daglish's) object, was to have the term reduced from six years to four years. In regard to the question of a double dissolution, there was this farther point, that a double dissolution would place members of the Legislative Council in a very awkward predicament; because as the Assembly was elected for three years only, when a double dissolution occurred a Legislative Councillor just elected might again have to face his constituents.

THE PREMIER: The Upper House would protect itself.

MR. DAGLISH: The Assembly was protected by the provision against a dissolution if a general election were due within 12 months. The proposal was inserted with the idea that it would not be availed of.

Amendment passed, and the clause as amended agreed to.

Clauses 4 to 7, inclusive—agreed to.

Clause 8—Electoral provinces:

MR. HOPKINS moved that the word "eight" in line 1 be struck out, and "twelve" inserted in lieu.

MR. MORAN opposed the amendment. The usual characteristics of an Upper House could not be retained where the provinces were made too small. Following the example of the Federal Constitution, their size should be increased. Rather than place the Upper House on the same basis as the Lower, abolish the former. The existence of a Federal Parliament made it advisable to retain for the present the full privileges of the Legislative Council.

MR. DAGLISH: The only object in having large provinces was to favour the candidate with the long purse. If smaller, the poor man could contest them, while the electors would become better acquainted with candidates. He did not believe in giving seats for life, and large electorates had that tendency.

MR. MORAN: Why not propose 24 provinces?

MR. DAGLISH: That would not be agreed to. The amendment contained a fair compromise.

MR. MORAN: The Labour party had been supporters of the Federal Senate Constitution, wherein the whole State was one province. Those who believed in an Upper House could not consistently reduce electorates; for the Upper House should represent large areas, so that its members might be free from local bias.

MR. HOPKINS: There were now ten provinces; the hon. member wished eight; a reasonable number was twelve.

Amendment passed.

MR. HOPKINS moved that in line 2 the word "three" be struck out, and "two" inserted.

Amendment passed, and the clause as amended agreed to.

Clauses 9, 10—agreed to.

Clause 11—Tenure of Members:

MR. HOPKINS moved that in line four the word "six" be struck out, and "four" inserted in lieu. Four years was a long enough term for a Councillor; and a study of the Upper House members would show that more frequent changes would be in the country's interest.

THE PREMIER: The good sense of the Committee would reject the amendment. The two main features of the Upper House were long tenure and continuity; and both should be retained. Popular interest in elections would not be increased by their recurrence every four years. The present unfortunate lack of interest arose because such elections were held at times when party feeling was dormant, and few even heard of them unless they took a personal interest in the contest. If there was a system of election every three years, unless something unforeseen occurred we should be in the position of having contests for the Upper House, if they did not come at the same time as the contests for the Lower House, about the same time, and some interest might then be excited in the elections. He asked members not to interfere with the tenure given by the existing Act and which was enjoyed by the other States.

MR. HASTIE: The Premier had urged that the continuity of the Council should

not be broken. Already on two occasions the Committee had resolved that the continuity of the Council should cease. After the passing of the Bill the Upper House was to be dissolved; also it was agreed that in certain cases members of the Council might be sent to the country; therefore there was not much in the argument that the continuity of the Council should be preserved. If it was necessary to have continuity in one House, why was it not necessary in the other? Was it reasonable to suppose that if members of the Upper House went to the country as often as the members of the Lower House the country would fare worse? There was nothing gained by continuity, or the same conditions would apply to both Houses. There would be less interest taken in connection with the Legislative Council if the elections were held every three years instead of every two years. He hoped the amendment would be carried, and that half the members of the Council would go the country every two years.

MR. MORAN: It was his intention to support the clause. If it had not been for the insertion of the provision doing away with the possibility of deadlocks, there might have been some reason to reduce the length of tenure for the Upper House to four years; but now it did not matter what length the tenure of members of the Council should be—it might as well be 10 years, because if the Lower House desired it could bring the Upper House to its knees as often as members liked.

MR. DAGLISH: It was not possible to see why the continuity of the office was beneficial in the case of the Legislative Council.

THE PREMIER: It was not desirable that the Upper House should be elected on a wave of passion.

MR. DAGLISH: The Premier had inserted in the Bill a provision for a double dissolution taking place, so that the Upper House might be elected at a time when there was excitement.

THE PREMIER: No wave had been known to last for three years, and that was the time it would take to reach that stage.

MR. DAGLISH: A double dissolution would not necessarily take more than from six to eight months, and with a double dissolution feeling would be aroused, because members of both Houses would be fighting the same battle in the same constituencies, one against the other. The amendment did not propose that the whole of the members of the Upper House should retire, but that half the members should go before their constituents at a certain period, and the only difference between the proposal and the amendment was as to the length of the period. The Premier had not shown that the difference in the period would make any alteration as to the continuity of office. A member could never be defeated whilst he was in touch with his constituents, therefore there would be no break in the continuity of office unless a member got out of touch with his constituents, in which case the sooner the continuity was broken the better. In reply to the statement that no public interest was evinced in elections to the Legislative Council, the last elections gave a contradiction to that statement, for at that time no less than three of the retiring councillors were defeated, showing the need of bringing them before the public oftener. Six years was too long a period in Western Australia, where the conditions were changing rapidly and the population increasing.

Amendment put, and a division taken with the following result:—

Ayes	...	...	10
Noes	...	...	21
Majority against	...	...	11

AYES.	NOES.
Mr. Bath	Mr. Atkins
Mr. Daglish	Mr. Butcher
Mr. Hastie	Mr. Doherty
Mr. Holman	Mr. Ewing
Mr. Hopkins	Mr. Foulkes
Mr. Johnson	Mr. Gardiner
Mr. Purkiss	Mr. Gordon
Mr. Reid	Mr. Gregory
Mr. Taylor	Mr. Higham
Mr. Wallace (*Teller*).	Mr. James
	Mr. Kingsmill
	Mr. McDonald
	Mr. Moran
	Mr. Nanson
	Mr. O'Connor
	Mr. Phillips
	Mr. Piesse
	Mr. Quinlan
	Mr. Rason
	Mr. Throssell
	Mr. Jacoby (*Teller*).

Amendment thus negatived, and the clause passed.

Clause 12—Rotation of Members:

MR. DAGLISH: Would it not be well to strike out "lowest" and insert "highest," since the member with the

highest number of votes would be most likely to secure re-election? The continuity of the Chamber would thus be as far as possible assured.

On formal motions by the PREMIER, agreed that "lowest," line 3, be struck out, and "smaller" inserted in lieu; that "second," line 4, be struck out, and "third" inserted in lieu; that in line 5, between "the" and "member" there be inserted "other," and that, in the same line the words "who polls the next lowest number of votes" be struck out.

Clause as amended agreed to.

Clauses 13 to 17, inclusive—agreed to.

Clause 18—Quorum:

MR. DAGLISH moved that, in line 1, "third" be struck out and "half" inserted in lieu.

THE PREMIER: One-third formed a quorum in this Chamber.

MR. DAGLISH: In connection with this Bill we had not yet come to this Chamber.

THE PREMIER: On the contrary, we had passed it.

MR. DAGLISH: Then on recommittal he would certainly move the same amendment in regard to a quorum of the Legislative Assembly.

THE PREMIER: Better attack both Houses at the same time.

MR. DAGLISH: No. The desire was to get an expression of opinion from the Committee, and the amendment had been moved for that end. It was not unreasonable to expect that half the members of a paid House of Parliament should be present while the House was sitting. Grave necessity existed for a larger quorum in this Chamber; but the necessity in a House consisting of only 24 members was still more urgent. Under the clause as it stood eight members of the Upper House were placed in a position to do the business of the country, and of those eight five would be a majority. At all events, eight was altogether too small a quorum of any parliamentary body.

MR. HOPKINS: Five members of the Council to throw out our Bills!

Amendment put, and a division taken with the following result:—

Ayes	...	...	22
Noes	...	...	10
Majority for	...	...	12

AYES.	NOES.
Mr. Atkins	Mr. Gardiner
Mr. Bath	Mr. Gregory
Mr. Butcher	Mr. James
Mr. Daglish	Mr. Kingsmill
Mr. Doherty	Mr. Monger
Mr. Ewing	Mr. Phillips
Mr. Foulkes	Mr. Piesse
Mr. Hastie	Mr. Rason
Mr. Holman	Mr. Throssell
Mr. Hopkins	Mr. Higham (*Teller*).
Mr. Jacoby	
Mr. Johnson	
Mr. McDonald	
Mr. McWilliams	
Mr. Moran	
Mr. Nanson	
Mr. O'Connor	
Mr. Purkiss	
Mr. Quinlan	
Mr. Reid	
Mr. Wallace	
Mr. Taylor (*Teller*).	

Amendment thus passed, and the clause as amended agreed to.

Clauses 19, 20—agreed to.

Clause 21—Vacancy by absence:

MR. DAGLISH moved that in line 2, "months" be struck out and "weeks" inserted in lieu. This was another instance of an amendment he intended to move, on recommital, in connection with this Chamber.

Amendment put, and a division taken with the following result:—

Ayes	...	...	9
Noes	...	...	23
Majority against	...		14

AYES.	NOES.
Mr. Bath	Mr. Atkins
Mr. Daglish	Mr. Butcher
Mr. Hastie	Mr. Doherty
Mr. Holman	Mr. Ewing
Mr. Johnson	Mr. Foulkes
Mr. O'Connor	Mr. Gardiner
Mr. Reid	Mr. Gregory
Mr. Taylor	Mr. Hopkins
Mr. Moran (*Teller*).	Mr. Jacoby
	Mr. James
	Mr. Kingsmill
	Mr. McDonald
	Mr. McWilliams
	Mr. Monger
	Mr. Nanson
	Mr. Phillips
	Mr. Piesse
	Mr. Purkiss
	Mr. Quinlan
	Mr. Rason
	Mr. Throssell
	Mr. Wallace
	Mr. Higham (*Teller*).

Amendment thus negatived, and the clause passed.

Clause 22 (postponed)—agreed to.

Clause 23 (postponed)—Qualification of electors (Council):

THE PREMIER moved that the word "until," in line 1, be struck out.

Amendment passed.

THE PREMIER moved that all the words after "the," in line 1, be struck out, and the following inserted in lieu:

"Qualification of electors of members of the Council shall be such as may be determined by the Parliament."

Amendment passed, and the clause as amended agreed to.

Clauses 24, 25 (postponed)—agreed to.

Clause 26 (postponed)—No person to be registered more than once for any one province:

Mr. DAGLISH: In order to make assurance sure he would move an amendment with the object of striking at the principle of plural voting. He thought the best way to do that would be to strike out the words "within an electoral province," in lines 1 and 2, and the words "for that province," at the end of the clause. He moved that the words "within an electoral province" be struck out.

Amendment put, and a division taken with the following result:—

Ayes	...	...	11
Noes	...	...	18
Majority against		...	7

AYES.	NOES.
Mr. Bath	Mr. Butcher
Mr. Daglish	Mr. Ewing
Mr. Hastie	Mr. Foulkes
Mr. Holman	Mr. Gardiner
Mr. Hopkins	Mr. Gregory
Mr. Jacoby	Mr. Hicks
Mr. Johnson	Mr. James
Mr. Nanson	Mr. Kingsmill
Mr. Reid	Mr. McDonald
Mr. Taylor	Mr. McWilliams
Mr. Wallace (*Teller*).	Mr. Monger
	Mr. Moran
	Mr. O'Connor
	Mr. Phillips
	Mr. Piesse
	Mr. Rason
	Mr. Throssell
	Mr. Higham (*Teller*).

Amendment thus negatived, and the clause passed.

Clause 27 (postponed)—Joint owners and occupiers:

THE PREMIER: This clause ought to come in the Electoral Bill. It was out of place here, and he moved that it be struck out.

Amendment passed, and the clause struck out.

New Clause:

MR. MORAN moved that the following be added to the Bill:—

Any member of Parliament who introduces a Bill to either House of Parliament, or who introduces any motion to either House, which is transmitted by message to the other House may, in either of such cases, take part in the other House in any discussion on such Bill or motion.

Early in the sitting it was decided to introduce a very sweeping change into the present system of relationship between the two Houses, by allowing a Minister of the Crown, and only a Minister, to go from one House to the other for the purpose of introducing and speaking to a Bill. It was a radical innovation, and the contention he advanced against it was that it was altogether unnecessary, that it was impracticable, that it would give the Minister a very big pull perhaps over the opponents of the Bill; and that whilst a Minister of the Crown could go to the other House and deliver a speech, those who opposed the measure in this House could not be heard there in opposition to it. That having been passed, there was no reason why it should not be made a little more sensible. For instance, many measures of great importance were introduced by private members, and motions of the greatest significance emanated from private members in this Chamber and also in the Upper House. If permission was given to a Minister of the Crown to go to the other House and speak on an ordinary Bill, there was no reason why a private member should not be allowed to do so in the other House.

MR. FOULKES: The matter was discussed this afternoon. This proposal was a most ridiculous one, but not a bit more so than the one before the Committee this afternoon. [MR. MORAN: Quite so.] It only completed the absurdity of the whole position. There was one argument which he omitted to mention this afternoon. A Bill might be brought forward in this House and keenly contested, the Government might carry it by one vote or by a very small majority, and the leader of the Opposition and some of his friends or some members in other parts of the House might have the greatest possible objections to the Bill; but according to that proposal by the Government, no one was to have an opportunity of explaining his opinion in the other House except Ministers themselves. It was the same as if two parties had a dispute and referred the matter to the Judge, and only the plaintiff was allowed to state his case. If, when Government and Opposition changed places, the member for West Perth were allowed to introduce a Bill into the Upper House, it would be extremely unfair to deny the present

Premier a similar privilege. By the latter as a private member some very important legislation had been introduced in this House, and some of his Bills thrown out in another place, where with his advocacy they might have passed. Mr. Justice Parker as a private member introduced here the Married Woman's Property Act, which passed by a fair majority, but by a narrow majority in another place. The clause would give only five members that privilege; but the amendment was ridiculous. In the principle of any members being allowed to speak in another House he did not believe, and therefore suggested that the amendment be postponed until the report stage.

MR. MORAN: To that he would agree if the Premier would on recommittal allow Clause 58 to be again discussed.

THE PREMIER: There had been sufficient discussion.

MR. MORAN: Then divide. If five members were allowed to wander from House to House, why should not all who introduced legislation have a similar privilege? The main principle was indefensible and a mere fad of the Premier; but the amendment would make it consistent, and minimise its evil consequences.

Question put, and a division taken with the following result:—

Ayes	...	...	16
Noes	...	...	14
Majority for	...	...	2

AYES.	NOES.
Mr. Bath	Mr. Daglish
Mr. Butcher	Mr. Ewing
Mr. Foulkes	Mr. Gardiner
Mr. Hastie	Mr. Gordon
Mr. Hicks	Mr. Gregory
Mr. Holman	Mr. James
Mr. Hopkins	Mr. Kingsmill
Mr. Johnson	Mr. Monger
Mr. McDonald	Mr. Phillips
Mr. McWilliams	Mr. Piesse
Mr. Moran	Mr. Quinlan
Mr. Nanson	Mr. Rason
Mr. O'Connor	Mr. Wallace
Mr. Taylor	Mr. Higham (*Teller*).
Mr. Throssell	
Mr. Jacoby (*Teller*).	

Question thus passed, and the new clause added.

First Schedule—agreed to.

Second Schedule—Section 70:

On motion by the PREMIER, progress reported and leave given to sit again.

PAPER PRESENTED.

By the COLONIAL SECRETARY: Report of the Aborigines Department for 1901-2.

Ordered: To lie on the table.

ELECTORAL ACT AMENDMENT BILL.

SECOND READING.

Resumed from the 12th November.

MR. C. J. MORAN (West Perth): This Bill is almost entirely contingent on the passing of the Constitution Act Amendment Bill. I think a general election will be brought about by the Constitution Bill. It is a question whether that Bill will be passed. For my part I hope it will not. I suggest to the Premier that we postpone the consideration of the Electoral Bill, as it is really contingent on the passing of the Constitution Act Amendment Bill. It would be almost impossible to make use of this Bill if we had a snap dissolution, although I do not think there is any chance of such a thing taking place.

THE PREMIER: The Electoral Bill is very necessary, whether the Constitution is amended or not.

MR. MORAN: I say the Bill is not necessary if the Constitution Bill be not passed. The voting by electors' rights principle could not be made use of in the immediate future.

THE PREMIER: All the more reason why the Electoral Bill should be passed as soon as possible.

MR. MORAN: I do not see any object in pressing forward this Bill, which I say is contingent on the passing of the Constitution Bill. I do not seem inclined, after discussing the Constitution Bill since half-past two o'clock, to debate this measure. I am down for the continuation of the debate, and I think it only right that a member should resume if he moved the adjournment of a debate; still I do not feel inclined. That will not prevent other members from speaking to the second reading.

MR. R. HASTIE (Kanowna): I do not think this Bill is one that requires very much discussion. We are all agreed that we should have an Electoral Bill, not because the present Act in this country is really a bad one, but because from all parts of the country there are many complaints that the Bill in some directions is very clumsy, and I have more than a

suspicion that there are a large number of electors who have not an opportunity of voting. The member for West Perth has said this Bill depends entirely on the passing of the Constitution Bill. I think, on the other hand, this Bill should become law at the earliest possible moment, so that we may have our law put into good order, and if by-elections do occur before the Constitution Bill is passed they can take place under this measure.

MR. MORAN: They could not take place under this Bill.

MR. HASTIE: They certainly could. This Bill is not contingent on the passing of the Constitution Bill, and I think it is a good thing to pass this measure as soon as possible. We are told by the Premier that the Bill is framed on the same lines as the Federal Electoral Act which has just been passed by the Commonwealth Parliament. I may point out that in some respects it differs from that law. The Premier, in introducing the Bill, claimed that it was an improvement on the Federal Act: of that I have some doubts. Although there are some distinctive features in this measure, it seems to be an improvement on the present law; but one or two striking conditions of the Federal Act are not embodied in this measure. The first provision of the Bill which I shall speak upon is the one-man-one-vote principle. That we have embodied in the Constitution; but it is necessary that we should have it in this Bill, in case the Constitution Bill does not come into law immediately. In addition to that we must, as under the Federal Act, consider the question whether we should not give for the Lower House and also for the Upper House a residence qualification alone. In the federal law residence only is considered. In South Australia, and I think I am right in saying in New Zealand, residence is required for both Houses of Parliament. The South Australian Act decrees that men can only be put on to the roll of the province in which they reside. When we are considering that part of the measure we shall have an opportunity, and I hope the House will embrace that opportunity, of carrying that proposal here. In this Bill there are various new proposals in reference to the system of voting by post. This is perhaps the first place where this system started; and the Federal Parliament and other Parliaments have followed our suit. This measure declares that we shall follow the example of the Federal Parliament and allow voting by post where the electors live a long way off. The Bill gives facilities for electors voting by post, or as it is called "an absent vote," in cases where electors are unable to appear at the polling booth during the time of the election. All this to my mind is very desirable, but the Federal Act has one very necessary restrictive clause in connection with this provision, which I would like to see inserted in this Bill. The Federal Act decrees that any officer who is appointed to take an absent vote is under a heavy penalty if he uses any influence on the elector as to the manner in which he shall vote. As this system is likely to become very popular here, and is likely to be used very largely, more than in any other part of Australia, on account of the great distances in this State, I hope we shall put a similar provision in this measure. The Premier says this Bill is more liberal than the Federal Act, inasmuch as it affirms that a candidate for parliamentary honours is allowed to spend more money than under the federal law. A candidate is not allowed under the Federal Act to pay an election agent, and although the sum of money he is allowed to pay under the Federal Act is £100, the same as we have here, yet according to the Act a candidate is allowed, in addition to the £100, to pay for postages, telegrams, and also for the purchase of rolls; and in some directions it seems undesirable for the Premier to allow people to spend more money in election expenses than what is provided by the federal law. That is a matter we may consider when in Committee. The great feature of the Bill is the provision which makes electors' rights an essential to voting. It is a very desirable provision, and the only doubt in my mind is whether it can be well carried out. I should like to see it carried out, and I will assist the Premier to the best of my power to make it an essential feature of the Bill. I have grave doubt if it is possible for us to have the next election under the electors' rights system unless arrangements are made by which electors' rights are handed out on

the day of election. We must remember the great distance people are from one another, and the large distribution of population, so that it is almost an impossibility to see that all people who are on the roll have electors' rights. The distribution of electors' rights can be carried out to a large extent if we make use of the police; in fact, I consider it absolutely necessary that it should be provided that the police of the country should be instructed to see that every person is on the roll and also that every person receives an elector's right. If that is not done, we shall not be satisfied that by a general election the true feeling of the country is expressed. There is one other matter which I should like to mention. There is a section of the Federal Act which was mentioned a great deal throughout Australia some time ago, decreeing that no member of a State Parliament shall be eligible for election to the Federal Parliament unless he ceases his connection with the State Parliament 14 days before nomination. The Bill we have decrees that no member of the Federal Parliament can be nominated for election to the State Parliament; so we are more liberal by 14 days than the Federal Parliament. I wish when in Committee to have an opportunity of considering whether we should not do away with this disqualification. It may give a check to that feeling which causes one Parliament to fear any opposition from members of another Parliament. To my mind the provision is unnecessary. I shall not mention any other matter in connection with the measure, but I hope the Government will place the Bill on the Order Paper for consideration at an early date, so that we shall have an opportunity of discussing the Bill in Committee, and when that is done all will agree to make the Bill as good as we possibly can.

MR. F. ILLINGWORTH (Cue): This Bill aims at a great advance in our electoral system. I have no objection whatever to offer to the main principles of the Bill, but there is in my mind a difficulty as to which I should like the Premier to give the House some information, if he will. My difficulty arises out of the interpretation of Clause 4. New rolls, it is provided, are to be made up from the existing rolls and the latest census return. Now, the principle of this Bill is that no one shall vote unless he has an elector's right. In what way and how can this possibly operate? The roll is to be made up from the census—indeed I think that is in process now; but what is the use of that roll if a man cannot vote unless he has an elector's right?

THE PREMIER: That observation applies to every roll. A man must have an elector's right before he can exercise his vote.

MR. ILLINGWORTH: But the principle of this Bill is that the roll shall be made up of those persons who have electors' rights.

THE PREMIER: But not the new roll, to start with.

MR. ILLINGWORTH: When the Premier was endeavouring to explain this matter to the House I interjected, but I did not seem to make my meaning clear then, and I seem not to have made it clear now. Here we have a roll made up of the census, which would give 100,000 odd voters on the list; but say the persons who apply for electors' rights number only 40,000, then only those 40,000 persons can vote at the first election. It is certain that will be the state of affairs. Large numbers of persons on the roll will come to the booth to vote, but not having electors' rights will not be able to vote. You, sir, are well acquainted, as are all members, with the great difficulties experienced ever since we had a constitution in getting people to make application to be put on the roll. Large organisations have been called into existence and have spent a good deal of time and money, and members themselves have spent a good deal of time and money in getting people on the roll. [MEMBER: Get the police to assist.] That will not meet the case. The police can assist in inducing people to make application, but still everyone must make individual application in order to get on the roll and obtain an elector's right. Is it proposed, then, to issue electors' rights to all people whose names will appear on the new census roll? Does the Premier see the point?

THE PREMIER: What you have in your mind is the difficulty arising in connection with the first general election.

MR. ILLINGWORTH: Clause 40 declares that we are to have a roll made

up from the census. Now, what is the use of that roll?

THE PREMIER: We must compile a roll some time.

MR. ILLINGWORTH: We shall make up a roll, then, from the census?

THE PREMIER: Yes.

MR. ILLINGWORTH: A man applies for an elector's right, but is not on the roll. Now, what is going to be done with that man?

THE PREMIER: He will be put on the roll.

MR. ILLINGWORTH: Then take the case of a man who is on the roll but has not an elector's right.

THE PREMIER: He will be given an elector's right.

MR. ILLINGWORTH: If he is on the roll he is entitled, or ought to be entitled, to vote, according to all our views of representation.

THE PREMIER: But we want the electors' rights system.

MR. ILLINGWORTH: I have pointed out the difficulty, and now I desire to impress on the Government the means presenting themselves to my mind of meeting this difficulty, which I can assure the Premier will prove a very great difficulty indeed. I assure him that out of the 100,000 people on the roll not 40,000 will have electors' rights at the next general election. If the number holding electors' rights reach even 40,000, it will be something marvellous. I repeat, if 40,000 people make application for electors' rights in time for the next general election, the fact will be something to marvel at. Then people will wake up on the day of election and experience a great desire to vote, and they will come to the polling booth. Now, unless the Government are prepared to make provision for every person who is entitled to vote to get his elector's right on the day of the first general election, a tremendous amount of injury will be done and a great deal of heartburning will be caused. The Government must certainly make provision, and for the first general election after the passing of this Bill they must be specially prepared to make sufficient provision; for most awkward questions will have to be settled. On the day of the next general election we may have one-half of the electors applying for electors' rights, and unless the amplest provision be made—and I contend that however costly and difficult it may be, adequate provision must be made for the first general election, so that every person who is entitled to vote may go to one booth and get his elector's right and then proceed to the polling booth and vote—we shall witness scenes such as have not occurred in Western Australia before. If the people were coming in hundreds, there would be no great difficulty; but they will be coming in thousands, and therefore the Government must make a great deal of preparation. West Perth, if I remember rightly, has something like 5,600 voters on the roll at the present time; and I will engage that not 1,500 out of that number will apply for electors' rights.

THE PREMIER: That depends on how far off the election is.

MR. ILLINGWORTH: But the Constitution Bill assumes to have an election next year.

THE PREMIER: The Constitution Bill, yes; but this Bill does not.

MR. ILLINGWORTH: The Constitution Bill assumes that we shall have an election next year; possibly we may not have it; but even though this Parliament should run to the ordinary time of death, eventually the difficulty will present itself.

THE PREMIER: Undoubtedly.

MR. ILLINGWORTH: Therefore I wish to impress on the Government the necessity for making sufficient provision to meet the difficulty when it does arise. I recommend that for a week preceding the general election the offices for issuing electoral rights be kept open till 8 or 9 o'clock in the evening, and that every facility be given to people to get on the roll, so that the pressure on election day may be eased; and I suggest that ample provision be made at every polling booth for the issue of electors' rights to all voters on election day. If that be done, I think we shall find this Electoral Bill the most effective ever passed in this State, or indeed in any State.

THE PREMIER: But do you think it is worth while considering whether the elector's-right provision should apply at the first election?

MR. ILLINGWORTH: I thought possibly that was the idea of the Government in including Clause 40. I see no utility in making up a roll unless it is intended to allow everyone who applies on election day for his vote to be placed on the roll. I suggest that we should be prepared to hand to every person who applies an elector's right.

THE PREMIER: That is a difficulty, and I want it discussed.

MR. ILLINGWORTH: Another provision, not contained in the Bill, I hold to be worthy of consideration. In all these States the cost of purging the electoral roll is enormous, while the purging is utterly ineffective and unsatisfactory. New Zealand has a system by which the roll is made up from the persons who actually voted; and in that colony it is assumed, if a man does not vote, that he is either dead or has gone away, and consequently his name is not put on the next roll. The man himself, if any sound reason kept him from the poll, knowing that he is no longer a voter, then makes application for his right. I should be glad to see a clause of that nature included in the Bill, because I think it would save an immense amount of money and a great deal of trouble. If the new electoral roll were made up at each general election from the persons actually voting, then we should have a satisfactory roll. Of course there are difficulties about it. For example, in a certain number of districts no contest would occur. Still, the provision would be of immense help to the Electoral Registrar in making up a roll. I congratulate the Government on bringing before us what I consider an exceedingly useful measure, and I hope we shall get it on the statute-book as speedily as possible. I trust that the Government will take steps to make the provisions and conditions of this measure known far and wide, and that every facility will be given for the issue of electors' rights; also that abundant facilities will be afforded for the issue of rights for the next general election. Otherwise, as I have said, half the people will be disfranchised, and that will be in the last degree unsatisfactory. I have much pleasure in supporting the second reading.

Question put and passed.

Bill read a second time.

REDISTRIBUTION OF SEATS BILL.

SECOND READING.

Debate resumed from the 9th October.

THE PREMIER (in reply): I understand that the Redistribution of Seats Bill being entirely a question of details as to boundaries, there is no desire to speak on the measure. I have seen the leader of the Opposition, who agrees that the Bill should be referred to a select committee after the second reading; and after the second reading has been passed I purpose to move accordingly.

Question put and passed.

Bill read a second time.

SELECT COMMITTEE.

THE PREMIER moved that the Bill be referred to a select committee.

Question put and passed.

Ballot taken, and a committee appointed comprising Mr. Hastie, Mr. Higham, Mr. Moran, Hon. F. H. Piesse, also Hon. Walter James as mover.

THE PREMIER farther moved that the committee have power to call for persons and papers, and to sit on those days on which the House stands adjourned; to report on the 27th November. He hoped members of the House would take the opportunity of conveying details to the committee in connection with the boundaries. We had to rely on the local knowledge of members.

HON. F. H. PIESSE said he would be glad to serve on the committee, but would not be able to attend on Monday or Friday. He would be able to be present on three days, and would do his best then to help.

Question put and passed.

ADJOURNMENT.

The House adjourned at 9·57 o'clock, until the next Tuesday.